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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the literature by applying the Granger-
causality approach and endogenous breakpoint test to offer an 
operational definition of contagion to examine European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries public debt 
behaviour. A database of yields on 10-year government bonds 
issued by 11 EMU countries covering fourteen years of monetary 
union is used.  The main results suggest that the 41 new causality 
patterns, which appeared for the first time in the crisis period, 
and the intensification of causality recorded in 70% of the cases, 
provide clear evidence of contagion in the aftermath of the 
current euro debt crisis. 
JEL classification: E44, F36, G15, C52 
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1. Introduction 
 
From the introduction of the euro in January 1999 until the collapse of the US financial institution 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, sovereign yields of euro area issues moved in a narrow range with 
only very slight differences across countries (see Figures 1 and 2). Nevertheless, following the Lehman 
Brothers collapse severe tensions emerged in financial markets worldwide, including the euro zone 
bond market. In fact, not only did the period of financial turmoil turn into a global financial crisis, but 
it also began to spread to the real sector, with a rapid, synchronized deterioration in most major 
economies. This financial crisis put the spotlight on the macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries which had largely been ignored during the 
period of stability when markets had seemed to underestimate the possibility that governments might 
default (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). Furthermore, in some EMU countries, problems in the 
banking sector spread to sovereign states because of their excessive debt issues made in order to save 
the financial industry; eventually, the global financial crisis grew into a full-blown sovereign debt crisis. 
Indeed, since 2010, Greece has been bailed out twice and Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus have also 
needed bailouts to stay afloat. These events brought to light the fact that the origin of sovereign debt 
crises in the euro area varies according to the country and reflects the strong interconnection between 
public and private debt (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013) 1. 
 
In this scenario, some of the research to date has focused on the analysis of interactions between the 
sovereign market and the financial sector [see Mody (2009), Ejsing and Lemke (2009), Gennaioli et al. 
(2013), Broner et al. (2011), Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Andenmatten and Brill (2011)]. Other 
researchers have discussed transmission and/or contagion between sovereigns in the euro area context 
[see Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), Metiu (2012), Caporin et al. (2013), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) 
and Gorea and Radev (2014) to name a few]. Finally, a strand of research has examined structural 
                                                          
1 Moro (2013) and Aizenman (2013) offer a literature review on the Eurozone economic and financial crisis. 
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breaks and sovereign credit risk in the Eurozone [see, e. g., Basse et al. (2012), Gruppe and Lange 
(2013) and Basse (2013)]. 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the last two branches of the literature by examining not only 
the transmission of sovereign risk, but also the contagion in euro area public debt markets. In the 
literature there is a considerable amount of ambiguity concerning the precise definition of contagion. 
There is no theoretical or empirical definition on which researchers agree and, consequently, the debate 
on exactly how to define contagion is not just academic, but also has important implications for 
measuring the concept and for evaluating policy responses. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) note five 
definitions of contagion used in the literature. Two of them have been predominantly used in empirical 
studies to analyze it in financial markets and have been adopted in common usage by governments, 
citizens and policymakers. The first defines contagion depending on the channels of transmission that 
are used to spread the effects of the crisis, whilst the second defines it depending on whether the 
transmission mechanisms are stable through time.  
 
Masson (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) apply the first definition, which argues that 
contagion arises when common shocks and all channels of potential interconnection are either not 
present or have been controlled for. So, the term contagion will only be applied when a crisis in one 
country may conceivably trigger a crisis elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic 
fundamentals2 – perhaps because it leads to shifts in market sentiment, or changes the interpretation 
given to existing information. According to the second definition, which was proposed in a seminal 
paper by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), contagion is a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a 
shock to one country (or group of countries)3. Therefore, if two markets show a high degree of co-
                                                          
2 The theory of “monsoonal effects” suggests that financial crises appear to be contagious because underlying macroeconomic variables 
are correlated. In this context, several important papers have focused on the macroeconomic causes of crises, for example, Eichengreen et 
al. (1996). 
3 The distinction between contagion which occurs at times of crisis, and interdependence which is a result of normal market interaction, 
has become the focal point of many contagion studies: see for example Corsetti et al. (2005) or Bae et al. (2003).  
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movement during periods of stability, even if they continue to be highly correlated after a shock to one 
market, this may not constitute contagion, but only the outcome of the “interdependence” that has 
always been present in the markets. The empirical analysis of Forbes and Rigobon definition of 
contagion implies then the presence of a tranquil, pre-crisis period in order to be able to examine 
whether a change in the intensity of the transmission has occurred after the shock. 
 
In this paper, we will use an operational approach based on the second of these definitions4 in order to 
capture the phenomenon of contagion quantitatively. Besides, among the five general strategies5 that 
have been used in the literature, our analysis will be related to one of the most conventional 
methodologies for testing for contagion: the analysis of cross-market correlations. However, we not 
only investigate changes in cross-market interdependencies via cointegration analysis, but also explore 
changes in the existence and direction of causality by means of a Granger-causality approach6 before 
and after endogenously (data-based) identified crises. Hence, the definition of contagion that we will 
explore in the remainder of this paper is the following: an abnormal increase in the number or in the 
intensity of causal relationships, compared with that of tranquil periods, triggered after an endogenously 
detected shock. 
 
Most studies in the literature investigate changes in cross-market correlations (see, e. g., Syllignakis and 
Kouretas, 2011); very few explore changes in the existence and direction of causality. Exceptions are 
studies by Edwards (2000) who focuses on Chile, Baig and Goldfajn (2001) who investigate contagion 
from Russia to Brazil, Gray (2009) who examines spillovers in Central and Eastern European countries, 
and both Granger et al. (2000) and Sander et al. (2003) who investigate spillovers during the Asian crisis. 
                                                          
4 In a very recent paper, Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014), analyze contagion using an approach that is based in the first definition 
of contagion [(Masson, 1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) among others]. Concretely, they examine whether the transmission of 
the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. Their results suggest the 
importance of both variables proxying market sentiment and macrofundamentals in determining contagion and underline the coexistence 
of “pure contagion” and “fundamentals-based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.  
5 Probability analysis, cross-market correlations, VAR models, latent factor/GARCH models, and extreme value/co-exceedance/jump 
approach (see Forbes, 2012). 
6 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest the use of this methodology when they point out that, if the source of the crisis is not well identified 
and endogeneity may be severe, it may be useful to utilize Granger-causality tests to determine the extent of any feedback from each 
country in the sample to the initial crisis country. 
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However, a small number of studies have applied a Granger-causality approach to the investigation of 
changes in the existence and direction of transmission in euro area debt markets. Among them, 
Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) analyze the dynamics of the credit default swap (CDS) market of 
peripheral EMU countries along with three central European countries (France, Germany and the UK) 
for the period of 2008–2010, and Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013) focus on the existence of 
possible Granger-causal relationships between the evolution of the yield of bonds issued solely by 
peripheral EMU countries during the period 1999-2010.   
 
Therefore, our study contributes to this literature by applying a Granger-causality approach to 10-year 
sovereign yields7 of both peripheral and central EMU countries8 on an extended time period spanning 
from the inception of the euro in January 1999, well before the global financial and sovereign debt 
crises, until December 2012. But, unlike previous studies in the literature (see Sander et al., 2003 o 
Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012), we do not set a specific breakpoint based on a priori knowledge of the 
potential break date. In our analysis, we use two techniques that take into consideration that the timing 
of the break is unknown and allow the data to indicate when regime shifts occur. Thus, break dates that 
identify the shock triggering contagion are determined endogenously by the model in each of the 
potential pair-wise causal relationships9. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the econometric methodology. 
The dataset used to analyze causality is described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical findings, 
whilst Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
                                                          
7 Our analysis focuses on 10-year yields instead of CDS since CDS data are not available for all the countries in the study until late 2008 - 
only one year before the onset of the euro sovereign debt crisis. 
8 Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013) report data of consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis provided by the Bank for 
International Settlements by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each country. These data suggest that 
the problems of peripheral countries can trigger contagion which may affect not only other peripheral countries but also central EMU 
countries, since some of these banks (mostly German and French banks) are highly exposed to the debt of peripheral countries. 
 
9 In the analysis we only analyze shock transmission between pairs, considering in each test that only one country is responsible of 
spreading the shock. Unlike previous crisis, since in the euro area sovereign debt crisis several peripheral countries entered a fiscal crisis at 
roughly the same time, it is very difficult to identify the country responsible of the origin of the shock.  
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2. Econometric methodology 
 
2.1 Testing for causality 
Granger’s (1969) causality test is widely used to test for the relationship between two variables. A 
variable X is said to Granger-cause another variable Y if past values of X help predict the current level 
of Y better than past values of Y alone, indicating that  past values of X have some informational 
content that is not present in past values of Y. This definition is based on the concept of causal 
ordering: two variables X and Y may be contemporaneously correlated by chance, but it is unlikely that 
the past values of X will be useful in predicting Y, giving all past values of Y10. 
 
Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length and, therefore, it is important to select the appropriate 
lengths11. Otherwise, the model estimates will be inconsistent and the inferences drawn may be 
misleading (see Thornton and Batten, 1985). In this paper, we use Hsiao’s (1981) generalization of the 
Granger notion of causality. Hsiao proposed a sequential method to test for causality, which combines 
Akaike (1974)’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on) and the definition of Granger-causality 
(Canova 1995, 62-63). Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off the bias that arises from 
underparameterization of a model against the loss in efficiency that results from its 
overparameterization.  
Consider the following models,  
 t 0
1
M
i t i t
i
Y Y  

                          (1)        
0
1 1
M N
t i t i j t j t
i j
Y Y X  	  
 
                       (2)       
where Xt and Yt are covariance-stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps are 
used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing causality: 
                                                          
10 Granger causality is not identical to causation in the classical philosophical sense, but it demonstrates the likelihood of this causation 
more forcefully than contemporaneous correlation (Geweke, 1984). 
11 The general principle is that the smaller lag length has smaller variance but runs a risk of bias, while larger lags will reduce the bias 
problem but may lead to inefficiency. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                            Document de Treball   2014/03  pàg. 9 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                            Working Paper 2014/03  pag. 9 
9
i) Treat Yt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with the order 
of lags mi varying from 1 to M. Examine the FPE  
 
1( ,0) ·
1
i
Y i
i
T m SSRFPE m
T m T
 

 
 
 where T is the total number of observations and SSR is the sum of squared  residuals of OLS 
regression (1). Choose mi for the value of m that minimizes the  FPE, say m, and denote the 
corresponding value as FPEY (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Yt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Xt as a manipulated variable as 
in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order of lags ni of Xt from 1 to N. Examine 
the FPE 
 
1( , ) ·
1
i i
Y i i
i i
T m n SSRFPE m n
T m n T
  

  
 
 Choose the order ni which gives the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the  corresponding FPE 
as FPEY (m,n). 
iii) Compare FPEY (m, 0) with FPEY (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) with the 
smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEY (m,0)-FPEY (m,n)>0, then Xt is said to cause Yt. If FPEY 
(m,0)-FPEY (m,n)<0, then Yt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Xt variable, treating Yt as the manipulated variable. 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are I(1) 
variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the causal relationships 
from Xt to Yt and from Yt  to Xt, using the following error correction models: 
0 1
1
M
t t i t i t
i
Y Z Y 
   

                        (3) 
        0 1
1 1
M N
t t i t i j t j t
i j
Y Z Y X 
  	   
 
                 (4) 
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where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression ( t tY X   ), known as the error-
correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I(1) variables but are not cointegrated, then  in (3) and (4) is 
assumed to be equal to zero. 
 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or they are not cointegrated], we can use 
Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Yt with Yt and Xt with Xt in steps (i) to (iv), as well as 
substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). 
 
 
 
2.2 Stability Diagnostics 
In the conventional Granger-causality analysis, the relationship between two variables is assumed to 
exist at all times. However, in a context of financial crisis, parameter non-constancy may occur and may 
generate misleading inferences if left undetected (see, Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003; Perron, 1989; Zivot 
and Andrews, 1992). Furthermore, the pre-testing issue in early studies may induce a size distortion of 
the resulting test procedures (Bai, 1997). Thus, it is desirable to let the data select when and where 
regime shifts occur (i. e., we need to test for the null hypothesis of no structural change versus the 
alternative hypothesis that changes are present). To this end, we first identify a single structural change 
using the Quandt–Andrews one-time unknown structural break test. We then use the procedure 
suggested by Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to detect multiple unknown breakpoints in 
order to obtain further evidence of the existence of the breakpoints previously detected endogenously. 
These breakpoints allow the identification of pre-crisis and crisis periods for each pair-wise causal 
relationship which, as explained in the Introduction, are needed for the detection of a possible 
contagion episode according to our operational definition based on Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
approach. 
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2.2.1 Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test 
A particular challenge in empirical time series analysis is to determine the appropriate timing of a 
potential structural break. In a traditional Chow (1960) test12, we have to set a specific breakpoint based 
on a priori knowledge about the potential break date. In our analysis, however, we do not assume any 
prior knowledge about potential break dates, but we make use of a data-based procedure to determine 
the most likely location of a break. In particular, we use the Quandt–Andrews unknown breakpoint 
test, originally introduced by Quandt (1960) and later developed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and 
Ploberger (1994). The idea behind the Quandt-Andrews test is that a single Chow breakpoint test is 
performed at every observation between two dates, or observations (1 and 2). The k test statistics from 
those Chow tests are then summarized into one test statistic for a test against the null hypothesis of no 
breakpoints between 1 and 2.   
 
For the unknown break date, Quandt (1960) proposed likelihood ratio test statistics for an unknown 
change point, called Supremum test, while Andrews (1993) supplied analogous Wald and Lagrange 
Multiplier test statistics for it. Then Andrews and Ploberger (1994) developed Exponential (LR, Wald 
and LM) and Average (LR, Wald and LM) tests. These tests are calculated by using individual Chow 
Statistics for each date of the data except for some trimmed portion from both ends of it. While the 
Supremum test finds the date that maximizes Chow Statistics, the most possible break point, the 
Average and Exponential tests use all the Chow statistic values and are only informative about the 
existence of the break but not about its date13.  
 
We set a search interval [0.15,0.85]   for the full sample T to allow a minimum of 15% of effective 
observations contained in both pre- and post-break periods. These tests allow us to determine a 
                                                          
12 The basic idea of the breakpoint Chow test is to fit the equation separately for each subsample and to see whether there are significant 
differences in the estimated equations. A significant difference indicates a structural change in the relationship.  
13 Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) provide tables of critical values, and Hansen (1997) provides a method to calculate 
p-values.  
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structural change with unknown timing endogenously from the data after examining each date of the 
data except for some trimmed portion from both ends of it. 
 
2.2.2 Multiple Breakpoint Tests 
Bai and Perron (1998) develop tests for multiple structural changes. Their methodology can be 
disentangled in two separate and independent parts. First, they propose a sequential method to identify 
any number of breaks in a time series, regardless of their statistical significance. Second, once the 
breaks have been identified, they propose a series of statistics to test for the statistical significance of 
these breaks, using asymptotic critical values. 
 
The sequential procedure is as follows: 
i. Begin with the full sample and perform a test of parameter constancy with unknown break. 
ii. If the test rejects the null hypothesis of constancy, determine the breakdate, divide the sample 
into two samples and perform single unknown breakpoint tests in each subsample. Add a 
breakpoint whenever in a subsample null is rejected. 
iii. Repeat the procedure until all of the subsamples do not reject the null hypothesis, or until the 
maximum number of breakpoints allowed or maximum subsample intervals to test is reached.  
 
For a specific set of unknown breakpoints 1( ,..., ) ,pT T  we use the following set of tests developed by 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to detect multiple structural breaks: the sup F type test, the double 
maximum tests, and the test for   versus 1  breaks. First, we consider the sup F type test of no 
structural breaks ( 0p ) versus the alternative hypothesis that there are kp   breaks. Second, we use 
the double maximum tests, UDmax and WDmax, testing the null hypothesis of no structural breaks 
against an unknown number of breaks given some upper bound m*. Finally, the sup   1TF  test, 
which is a sequential test of the null hypothesis of   breaks against the alternative of 1  breaks. The 
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test is applied to each segment containing the observations 1iTˆ  to iTˆ   11  ,,i . To run these 
tests it is necessary to decide the minimum distance between two consecutive breaks, h, which is 
obtained as the integer part of a trimming parameter,  , multiplied by the number of observations T 
(we use 150.   and allow up to four breaks). 
 
2.3 Testing for Causality Intensification 
As stated above, Granger causality measures precedence and information content.  Therefore, the 
statement “X Granger causes Y” implies that past values of X provide relevant and valuable 
information about the future behaviour of Y that is not present in past values of Y. 
  
Since the statistic we use to detect Granger-causality is FPEY (m,0)-FPEY (m,n), we can compute this 
statistic before and after the endogenously identified breakpoint, and thus assess the intensification or 
reduction in the causal relationship for those pairs in which we have found Granger-causality in both 
periods. Therefore, we take an increase of Granger causality as an amplification of the statistical 
predictability of one time series for another as evidence of an intensification in the transmission 
mechanism between them. 
 
To this end, for each pair-wise relationship where we find causality both in the tranquil and in the crisis 
periods, we compare FPEY (m,0)-FPEY (m,n) in these periods. If this statistic is higher in the crisis than 
in the tranquil period, we can conclude that an intensification in the causal relationship has taken place. 
Indeed, this result shows that in the crisis period, even though the uncertainty is by definition higher, 
the Xt (or Xt) in equation (2) [or in equation (4)] contains relatively more useful information for 
forecasting the Yt (or Yt) which is not contained in past values of Yt (or  Yt), than during the pre-
crisis period. Conversely, if this statistic is lower in the crisis period than in the tranquil one, we can 
infer a reduction in the causal relationship, since the extra lagged variables are less useful now for 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                            Document de Treball   2014/03  pàg. 14 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                            Working Paper 2014/03  pag. 14 
14
providing information about the future behaviour of the yield under study during the crisis period than 
during the pre-crisis period.  
 
In doing so, we are first evaluating the “forecast conditional efficiency” in the terminology of Granger 
and Newbold (1973, 1986) [or “forecast encompassing” according to Chong and Hendry (1986) and 
Clements and Hendry (1993)] of the manipulated variable Xt (or Xt) in equation (2) [or equation (4)] 
for each period, by examining whether Xt (or Xt) contains useful information for forecasting the Yt 
(or  Yt) which is not contained in past values of Yt (or  Yt), and then comparing them and assessing 
the relative gains in forecast accuracy in each period. 
 
3. Data  
We use daily data of 10-year bond yields from January 1st 1999 to December 31st 2012 collected from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream for EMU-11 countries: both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here] 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of daily 10-year bond yields for each country in our sample, whilst Figure 2 
displays the evolution of their spread against the German bund. A simple look at these figures allows us 
to identify two periods, although the breakpoint is not the same in all countries. Between January 1999 
and summer 2008, the 10-year bond yields of different countries were evolving simultaneously, and 
spreads presented only small differences across countries. Only at the end of this period, following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, did the major tensions emerging in the financial 
markets worldwide affect the euro area sovereign debt market since, in a context in which the crisis had 
already reached the real sector, the problems in the banking sector began to spread to euro area 
sovereign states.  
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The descriptive statistics of the 10-year government bond yields in EMU countries during the sample 
period, (not reported here to save space, but available from the authors upon request) suggest that the 
mean is not significantly different from zero for the first differences and that normality is strongly 
rejected for both the levels and first differences. Our results also indicate the presence of 
heteroskedaticity, in line with the findings by Favero and Missale (2012) and Groba et al. (2013) among 
many others.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Preliminary analysis 
As a first step, we tested for the order of integration of the 10-year bond yields by means of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Then, following Cheung and Chinn (1997)’s suggestion, we 
confirm the results using the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary 
process against the alternative of a unit root. The results, not shown here to save space but available 
from the authors upon request, decisively reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the first 
regressions. They do not reject the null hypothesis of stationarity in first differences, but strongly reject 
it in levels, in the second ones. So, they suggest that both variables can be treated as first-difference 
stationary. 
As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 55 pair combinations14 of EMU-11 
yields using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. The results suggest15 that only for the Austria-Finland, 
Austria-France, Finland-France, Finland-Netherlands, Greece-Ireland, Greece-Portugal, Ireland-Italy, 
Ireland-Portugal, Italy-Netherlands and Italy-Portugal cases does the trace test indicate the existence of 
one cointegrating equation at least at the 0.05 level. Therefore, for these pairs we test for Granger-
                                                          
14 Recall that the number of possible pairs between our sample of EMU-11 yields is given by the following formula 
! 11! 55
!( )! 2!(11 2)!
n
r n r
 
 
15 The results are not presented, either, to save space but are available from the authors upon request. 
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causality in the first difference of the variables, with an error-correction term added [i. e., equations (3) 
and (4)], whereas for the remaining cases, we test for Granger-causality in the first difference of the 
variables, with no error-correction term added [i. e., equations (3) and (4) with =0] 
 
4. 2. Detecting structural breakpoints 
As we explained above, in order to detect contagion in the euro area sovereign debt markets, we need 
to identify a tranquil or pre-crisis period. To do so, unlike previous studies, we do not set a specific 
breakpoint based on a priori knowledge about the potential break date; first we apply the Quandt-
Andrews breakpoint test and let the data select when regime shifts occur in each potential causal 
relationship, and later we confirm the identified breakpoint by using the tests developed by Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003) to detect multiple structural breaks16. Table 1 shows that 70% of the total break 
dates (77 out of the 110 cases analysed) can be explained by some of the following five triggering 
events17: (1) the increase in the ECB interest rates by 25 basis points on July 3rd 2008; (2) the Lehman 
Brothers collapse on September 15th 2008; (3) the admission by Papandreou’s government that its 
finances were far worse than in previous announcements in November 2009; (4) Greece’s request for 
financial support on April 23rd 2010; and (5) Ireland’s request of financial support on November 21st 
2010. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
These results suggest that not only can most of the breakpoints be explained by systemic shocks, but 
that more than half of them (60 out of 110) are directly connected to the euro sovereign debt crisis 
(triggering events 4 to 5). Besides, 69 out of the 110 breakpoints (i. e., 63%) occur after November 
2009, after Papandreou’s government had disclosed that its finances were far worse than previously 
                                                          
16 We compute the breakpoint tests using a statistic which is robust to heteroskedasticity, since we estimate our original equations with 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
17 In order to save space, the numerical results of Quandt-Andrews and Bai-Perron tests are not reported in Table 1, but they are also 
available upon request. 
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announced18, with a yearly deficit of 12.7% of GDP, four times more than the euro area’s limit (and 
more than double the previously published figure), and a public debt of $410 billion. We should recall 
that this announcement only served to worsen the severe crisis in the Greek economy, and the 
country’s debt rating was lowered to BBB+ (the lowest in the euro zone) on December 8th. These 
episodes marked the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Furthermore, it is also notable that all break dates, including the 30% which are not related to one of 
the five triggering events mentioned above19, occur between January 2008 and December 2010, 
suggesting that systemic rather than idiosyncratic factors explain euro area sovereign debt market 
turmoil. Therefore, since the precise regime shift date changes depending on the causal relationship, 
our analysis improves on previous studies by using in each relationship the breakpoint obtained from 
the Quandt–Andrews and Bai-Perron tests. 
 
4. 3. Changes in the number of Granger-causal relationships 
Given the evidence presented in the previous sub-section, in ten relationships (Austria-Finland, 
Austria-France, Finland-France, Finland-Netherlands, Greece-Ireland, Greece-Portugal, Ireland-Italy, 
Ireland-Portugal, Italy-Netherlands and Italy-Portugal) we test for Granger-causality in the first 
difference of the variables, with an error-correction term added. In all other cases, we test for Granger-
causality in the first difference of the variables, with no error-correction term added. The causal 
relationships resulting from the estimated FPE statistics for the pre-crisis and crisis periods jointly with 
                                                          
18 These results are in line with Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) who find that none of the variables measuring global (world) 
market sentiment was statistically significant, suggesting that shifts in local (country-specific) or regional (European) rather than global 
market sentiment are behind euro area debt crisis transmission. 
19 We make use of equality tests to formally evaluate the null hypothesis that the mean and variance in the pre-crisis and crisis periods are 
equal against the alternative that they are different. The results (not shown here to save space, but available from the authors upon 
request) indicate strong evidence that they differ across periods.  
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the break dates resulting from the Quandt–Andrews and Bai-Perron tests are shown in Tables 2 and 
320. 
[Insert Table 2 and Table 3 here] 
The changes in causal relationships in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period are illustrated 
in Figures 3 and 4 (grey arrows represent relationships that did not exist before the breakpoint, whilst 
discontinuous arrows reflect relationships that disappear with the crisis). 
 [Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 here] 
Specifically, Table 2 and Figure 3 present the evolution of the causality running from EMU peripheral 
countries. The behaviour of causality running from EMU peripheral to central countries is displayed in 
Panel A of Table 2 and Figure 3a; whilst Panel B of Table 2 and Figure 3b show the evolution of 
causality running within EMU peripheral countries. Likewise, Table 3 and Figure 4 present the changes 
in causality running from EMU central countries. Panel A of Table 3 and Figure 4a illustrate the 
evolution of causality running from EMU central to peripheral countries while Panel B of Table 3 and 
Figure 4b report how causality running within EMU central countries has evolved during the two 
periods. 
 
As can be seen, for the four subsamples of countries, the number of causal relationships increases as 
the financial and sovereign debt crisis develops in the euro area. If we focus on the evolution of 
causality between EMU peripheral and EMU central countries (Panels A of Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 
3a and 4a), it can be observed that in the pre-crisis period causality is higher if EMU central countries 
are triggers rather than EMU peripheral countries. In particular, our results indicate the existence of 19 
causal relationships in the first case (Figure 4a) and 10 in the second (Figure 3a). Two interesting 
findings are worth pointing out: (1) in the pre-crisis period, the evolution of Greek sovereign yields 
                                                          
20 These results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint hypothesis 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0,n	 	 	     and the Williams-Kloot 
test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959). These additional results are not shown here to save space, but are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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does not Granger-cause that of other EMU central countries, and (2) the Netherlands’ yield behaviour 
is not Granger-caused by the evolution of yields of any EMU peripheral country (see Figure 3a). 
 
During the crisis period, even though the number of causal relationships detected increases in both 
directions, they are more frequent when EMU peripheral countries are the triggers.  
We find 27 out of 30 causal relationships when the EMU peripheral countries are the triggers (Figure 
3a), whilst the number of causality linkages rises from 19 to 24 if the triggers are EMU central countries 
(Figure 4a). Interestingly, Greece now Granger-causes Austria, Belgium, Finland and France while 
Netherlands’ yield behaviour is caused by the Spanish and the Irish one. Moreover, another relevant 
finding is that with the crisis, four causal relationships from central to peripheral countries disappear: 
Austria-Ireland, Belgium-Greece, France-Portugal and Netherlands-Ireland, suggesting a temporal 
disconnection between them.  
 
Panel B of Table 2 and Figure 3b, which show the results regarding causal relationships running within 
EMU peripheral countries in the two periods under study, also suggest that their number is boosted as 
the financial and sovereign debt crises expand in the euro area. We find evidence of 14 relationships in 
the pre-crisis period (Figure 3b) and 20 in the crisis period. In the pre-crisis period the exceptions are: 
a) Greece-Ireland, where there is no evidence of Granger-causality in either direction, and b) some 
relationships where we do not find unidirectional Granger-causality: from Greece to Italy and Spain, 
and from Portugal and Spain to Ireland. Nevertheless, we find evidence of bidirectional causality in all 
the relationships during the crisis period. 
 
Finally, Panel B of Table 3 and Figure 4b present the results regarding causality running within EMU 
central countries in the two periods. From these results it can be inferred that the number of causal 
relationships also increases in the crisis period, since we find evidence of bidirectional causality in all 15 
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relationships (Figure 4b). Hence, causality linkages increase from 21 to 30 during the crisis compared to 
the pre-crisis period. 
 
4. 4. Changes in the intensity of Granger-causal relationships 
As mentioned above, for each of the 60 cases where we find causality in both the tranquil and the crisis 
periods, we compare FPEX (m,0)-FPEX (m,n) in the two periods. If this statistic is higher in the crisis 
than in the tranquil period, we can conclude that the causal relationship has intensified. Conversely, if 
this statistic is lower in the crisis period than in the tranquil one, we can infer a reduction in the causal 
relationship. 
 
In the last column in Tables 2 and 3, we report the results of this exploratory exercise. As can be seen, 
even though in the aftermath of the crisis there is an increase in volatility (see Figure 1), we obtain 
evidence of causality intensification with respect to the more stable pre-crisis period21. The causing 
yields improve the forecast accuracy of the caused yields during the crisis period compared with the 
tranquil period, indicating that after the detected breakpoint they carry even more useful informational 
content about the future behaviour of the caused yields.      
Regarding the causal relationships running from EMU peripheral to EMU central countries, an increase 
in causality after the endogenously identified crisis is detected in six of the 10 possible cases (Panel A of 
Table 2). As for the causality linkages going from EMU central to EMU peripheral countries, in 10 out 
of the 15 cases where we find causality both in the tranquil and in the crisis period, we find that the 
relationship intensifies (Panel A of Table 3).  With regard to the causal relationships within EMU 
peripheral countries, we find evidence of significant relative rise in causality after the crisis in 12 out of 
the 14 possible cases (Panel B of Table 2). Finally, when examining the causal relationships within 
                                                          
21 Note that, in contrast to tests for contagion based on cross-market correlation measures, we do not need to adjust for the shift in 
volatility from the tranquil period to the crisis period. 
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EMU central countries we conclude that they increase after the crisis in 14 of the 21 possible cases 
(Panel B of Table 3).  
 
4.5. Contagion assessment 
From the above analysis we can conclude that, in the crisis period, not only do we find some new 
causality patterns which had been absent before its start, but also an intensification of causality in 70% 
of the cases which would allow us to establish that those linkages may be purely crisis-contingent.  
 
Specifically, causal relationships running from EMU peripheral countries record an important increase 
in the crisis period: not only relationships within peripheral countries (Figure 3b shows six new 
linkages), but also causal relationships running from EMU peripheral to EMU central countries (Figure 
3a displays 17 new causality patterns). This suggests that the problems of peripheral countries can spill 
over not only to other peripheral countries but also to EMU central countries since some of these 
banks (mostly German and French banks) are highly exposed to the debt of peripheral countries (see 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013). Moreover, several studies show that sovereign bond yields are 
not only driven by country-specific risk factors but that they are also significantly affected by global risk 
factors [see Groba et. al. (2013) and Dieckmann and Plank (2011) among them]. These global risk 
factors reflect global investors’ risk aversion, since in times of uncertainty, they become more risk 
averse and the “flight-to-safety” motive favors bonds of countries that are generally regarded to have a 
low default risk (e.g. during the crisis Germany experienced one of its lowest yields’ levels in history). 
Therefore, an increase in the Granger-causality of bond yields from peripheral to central countries 
might also reflect a general increase in investors’ risk aversion which might have driven an increase of 
yields in those countries. Indeed, 10-year yields spreads over Germany of Austrian, Finish, French and 
Dutch government’s bonds achieved a maximum level of 183, 83, 189 and 84 basis points (in 
November 2011 in the first three countries and in April 2012 in the case of the Netherlands, see Figure 
2) while the credit rating provided by the three most important agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s 
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and Fitch) at the same date was, like in Germany, the highest one. The reason behind sovereign risk rise 
in central countries, triggered by the behaviour of peripheral countries, can be related to herding 
behavior or panic among investors which leads to what is named by the literature as “pure contagion” 
(see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014). Besides, the fact that tensions in sovereign debt markets 
also spread to EMU central countries is also stressed by the nine new linkages that appear (see Figures 
4a and 4b) both in the causal relationships running from EMU central to EMU peripheral countries 
and between EMU central countries.  
 
In our view, these 41 new causality patterns out of the 101 causal relationships that exist in the crisis 
period within the 11 euro area countries analyzed (which were absent before the break date, determined 
endogenously for each causal relationship), together with the intensification of the causal relationship in 
42 of the 60 cases in which we find causality both in the tranquil and in the crisis period, can be 
considered an important operative measure of contagion consistent with both our definition and the 
literature, as they represent additional linkages during crisis periods in excess of those that arise during 
non-crisis periods; see for example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Masson (1999), Pericoli and Sbracia 
(2003) or Dungey et al. (2006).  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has three main objectives: to test for the existence of possible Granger-causal relationships 
between the evolution of the yield of bonds issued by both peripheral and central EMU countries, to 
determine endogenously the breakpoints in the evolution of those relationships and to detect contagion 
episodes according to an operative definition: an abnormal increase in the number or in the intensity of 
causal relationships compared with that of tranquil periods, triggered by an endogenously detected 
shock. 
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The most important results that emerge from our analysis are the following: (1) Around two thirds out 
of the total endogenously identified breakpoints occur after November 2009, when Papandreou’s 
government revealed that its finances were far worse than previous announcements, suggesting that 
most of the breakpoints can be explained by systemic shocks directly connected to the euro sovereign 
debt crisis. (2) The number of causal relationships increases as the financial and sovereign debt crisis 
unfolds in the euro area, and causality patterns after the break dates are more frequent when EMU 
peripheral countries are the triggers. (3) In the crisis period we find evidence of 101 causal 
relationships: 41 represent new causality linkages and 60 are patterns that already existed in the tranquil 
period. However, we find an intensification of the causal relationship in 42 out of the 60 cases. In our 
opinion, these 41 new causality patterns, together with the intensification of the causal relationship in 
70% of the cases can be considered an important operative measure of contagion that is consistent with 
the definition we have proposed. 
Regarding policy implications, our results seem to indicate that EMU has brought about strong 
interlinkages of the participating countries which are reasonable within a group of countries that share 
an exchange rate agreement (a common currency in the case of the euro area) and where financial crises 
tend to be clustered (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). Therefore, we consider that our results might 
have some practical meaning for investors and policymakers, as well as some theoretical insights for 
academic scholars interested in the behaviour of EMU sovereign debt markets. Our methodology could 
be used as a tool to provide information regarding the drivers and the time-varying intensity of crisis 
transmission, in the euro area sovereign debt markets, after a shock, which is an important question 
that can help policymakers to react in the future in order to avoid another. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that our analysis is devoted to bivariate series analysis. The extension to 
multivariate series analysis is reserved for future research. In view of the encouraging results of the 
present study, some optimism about the benefits from implementing this analysis seems justified. 
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Figure 1. Daily 10-year sovereign yields in EMU-11 countries: 1999-2012 
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Figure 2. Daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany: 1999-2012
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
01
/0
1/
19
99
01
/0
5/
19
99
01
/0
9/
19
99
01
/0
1/
20
00
01
/0
5/
20
00
01
/0
9/
20
00
01
/0
1/
20
01
01
/0
5/
20
01
01
/0
9/
20
01
01
/0
1/
20
02
01
/0
5/
20
02
01
/0
9/
20
02
01
/0
1/
20
03
01
/0
5/
20
03
01
/0
9/
20
03
01
/0
1/
20
04
01
/0
5/
20
04
01
/0
9/
20
04
01
/0
1/
20
05
01
/0
5/
20
05
01
/0
9/
20
05
01
/0
1/
20
06
01
/0
5/
20
06
01
/0
9/
20
06
01
/0
1/
20
07
01
/0
5/
20
07
01
/0
9/
20
07
01
/0
1/
20
08
01
/0
5/
20
08
01
/0
9/
20
08
01
/0
1/
20
09
01
/0
5/
20
09
01
/0
9/
20
09
01
/0
1/
20
10
01
/0
5/
20
10
01
/0
9/
20
10
01
/0
1/
20
11
01
/0
5/
20
11
01
/0
9/
20
11
01
/0
1/
20
12
01
/0
5/
20
12
01
/0
9/
20
12
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND FRANCE GREECE IRELAND ITALY NETHERLAND PORTUGAL SPAIN 
 
In
st
itu
t d
e 
R
ec
er
ca
 e
n 
E
co
no
m
ia
 A
pl
ic
ad
a 
R
eg
io
na
l i
 P
úb
lic
a 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 D
oc
um
en
t d
e 
Tr
eb
al
l  
 2
01
4/
03
  p
àg
. 2
9 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
In
st
itu
te
 o
f A
pp
lie
d 
E
co
no
m
ic
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
20
14
/0
3 
 p
ag
. 2
9 
29
F
ig
u
re
 3
: C
au
sa
l r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
fr
om
 E
M
U
 P
er
ip
h
er
al
 c
ou
n
tr
ie
s.
 
 F
ig
u
re
 3
a:
 C
au
sa
l r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
fr
om
 E
M
U
 P
er
ip
h
er
al
 t
o 
C
en
tr
al
 c
ou
n
tr
ie
s 
   
   
  F
ig
u
re
 3
b
: C
au
sa
l r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
w
it
h
in
 E
M
U
 P
er
ip
h
er
al
 c
ou
n
tr
ie
s 
 P
re
-c
ri
si
s 
P
er
io
d
 
  C
ri
si
s 
P
er
io
d
 
 
 
P
re
-c
ri
si
s 
P
er
io
d
 
 
   C
ri
si
s 
P
er
io
d
 
 
 
In
st
itu
t d
e 
R
ec
er
ca
 e
n 
E
co
no
m
ia
 A
pl
ic
ad
a 
R
eg
io
na
l i
 P
úb
lic
a 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 D
oc
um
en
t d
e 
Tr
eb
al
l  
 2
01
4/
03
  p
àg
. 3
0 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
In
st
itu
te
 o
f A
pp
lie
d 
E
co
no
m
ic
s 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
20
14
/0
3 
 p
ag
. 3
0 
30
F
ig
u
re
 4
: C
au
sa
l r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
fr
om
 E
M
U
 C
en
tr
al
 c
ou
n
tr
ie
s.
 
 F
ig
u
re
 4
a:
 C
au
sa
l r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
fr
om
 E
M
U
 C
en
tr
al
 t
o 
P
er
ip
h
er
al
 c
ou
n
tr
ie
s 
   
   
  F
ig
u
re
4b
: C
au
sa
l r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
s 
w
it
h
in
 E
M
U
 C
en
tr
al
 c
ou
n
tr
ie
s 
 P
re
-c
ri
si
s 
P
er
io
d
 
 
 
 C
ri
si
s 
P
er
io
d
 
 
 
P
re
-c
ri
si
s 
P
er
io
d
 
 
 C
ri
si
s 
P
er
io
d
 
 
 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                            Document de Treball   2014/03  pàg. 31 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                            Working Paper 2014/03  pag. 31 
31
Table 1: Causal relationships’ break datesa 
Causal relationship Break date Causal relationship Break date 
Panel A: 07/03/2008: ECB increases interest rates by 25 
basis points 
Panel B:  09/15/2008: Lehman Brothers files for 
bankruptcy 
PT  NL 07/04/2008 PT  IT 09/15/2008 
SP  NL 07/04/2008 PT  GE 10/08/2008 
FR  NL 07/04/2008 SP  GE 10/08/2008 
GE  FI 07/04/2008 FR  FI 10/08/2008 
GE  NL 07/04/2008 SP  IT 10/08/2008 
NL  GE 07/04/2008 NL  FI 10/28/2008 
IE  NL 07/04/2008 BE  GE 11/04/2008 
IT  GE 07/04/2008 IE  IT 11/14/2008 
GR  GE 07/04/2008 GR  IT 11/28/2008 
GR  NL 07/04/2008 
FR  PT 07/04/2008 
FR SP 07/04/2008 
IE  GE 07/04/2008 
BE  NL 07/24/2008 
Panel C:  November 2009: Papandreou's government 
reveals that its finances were far worse than previous 
announcements 
Panel D:  04/23/2010: Greece seeks financial support 
BE  PT 11/30/2009 IT  AT 05/05/2010 
IT  PT 12/03/2009 FR  IT 05/07/2010 
IT SP 12/03/2009 GE  IT 05/10/2010 
GR  AT 12/21/2009 GR SP 05/10/2010 
PT  FR 12/21/2009 NL  IT 05/10/2010 
SP  FR 12/21/2009 IT  NL 05/10/2010 
Panel E: 11/21/2010: Ireland seeks financial support SP  AT 05/10/2010 
FI  PT 11/21/2010 FR  AT 05/10/2010 
FI SP 11/21/2010 FR  BE 05/11/2010 
BE  SP 11/21/2010 FI  IT 05/11/2010 
FI  IE 11/21/2010 FI  GR 05/11/2010 
BE  IE 11/21/2010 AT  GR 05/11/2010 
NL  IE 11/21/2010 AT  PT 05/11/2010 
AT  BE 11/21/2010 BE  IT 05/11/2010 
AT  NL 11/21/2010 BE  GR 05/11/2010 
BE  FR 11/21/2010 IE  BE 05/11/2010 
FI  FR 11/21/2010 IE  GR 05/12/2010 
IT  IE 11/21/2010 IT  GR 05/12/2010 
PT  IE 11/21/2010 SP  GR 05/12/2010 
SP  IE 11/21/2010  
SP PT 11/21/2010  
GE  IE 11/22/2010  
AT  SP 11/23/2010  
AT  IT 11/23/2010  
GE  BE 11/24/2010  
NL  BE 11/24/2010  
NL  FR 11/24/2010  
FI  BE 11/24/2010  
SP  BE 11/24/2010  
GR  BE 11/24/2010  
IT  BE 11/24/2010  
PT  BE 11/24/2010 
AT  FI 11/25/2010 
NL SP 11/25/2010  
GE  GR 12/10/2010  
NL  GR 12/10/2010  
 
                                                          
a Notes: Five triggering events explain 70% of total break dates. 
AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
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Table 2: Causality running from EMU Peripheral countriesb 
 
Panel A: Causality running from EMU Peripheral to Central countries  
 Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period Break date Causality 
Changes 
IE  AT No Yes 09/18/2009 New 
IE  BE No Yes 05/11/2010 New 
IE  FI Yes Yes 01/29/2009 Intensification 
IE  FR No Yes 03/23/2010 New 
IE  GE Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Reduction 
IE  NL No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
IT  AT Yes Yes 05/05/2010 Reduction 
IT  BE Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Intensification 
IT  FI Yes Yes 07/04/2010 Intensification 
IT  FR No Yes 01/05/2009 New 
IT  GE Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Reduction 
IT  NL No No 05/10/2010 - 
GR  AT No Yes 12/21/2009 New 
GR  BE No Yes 11/24/2010 New 
GR  FI No Yes 07/04/2010 New 
GR  FR No Yes 01/06/2009 New 
GR  GE No No 07/04/2008 - 
GR  NL No No 07/04/2008 - 
PT  AT No Yes 01/06/2009 New 
PT  BE Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Intensification 
PT  FI Yes Yes 07/04/2010 Reduction 
PT  FR No Yes 12/21/2009 New 
PT  GE No Yes 10/08/2008 New 
PT  NL No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
SP  AT Yes Yes 05/10/2010 Intensification 
SP  BE No Yes 11/24/2010 New 
SP  FI No Yes 07/04/2010 New 
SP  FR Yes Yes 12/21/2009 Intensification 
SP  GE No Yes 10/08/2008 New 
SP  NL No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
Panel B: Causality running within EMU Peripheral countries  
 Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period Break date Causality 
changes 
IE  IT Yes Yes 11/14/2008 Intensification 
IE  GR No Yes 05/12/2010 New 
IE  PT Yes Yes 06/22/2009 Intensification 
IE SP Yes Yes 03/02/2009 Intensification 
IT  IE Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
IT  GR Yes Yes 05/12/2010 Intensification 
IT  PT Yes Yes 12/03/2009 Reduction 
IT SP Yes Yes 12/03/2009 Intensification 
GR  IE No Yes 07/05/2010 New 
GR  IT No Yes 11/28/2008 New 
GR  PT Yes Yes 02/02/2010 Intensification 
GR SP No Yes 05/10/2010 New 
PT  IE No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
PT  IT Yes Yes 09/15/2008 Reduction 
PT  GR Yes Yes 08/05/2010 Intensification 
PT SP Yes Yes 15/01/2010 Intensification 
SP  IE No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
SP  IT Yes Yes 10/08/2008 Intensification 
SP  GR Yes Yes 05/12/2010 Intensification 
SP PT Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
b Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, respectively. Bold values indicate absence of Granger-causality. 
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Table 3: Causality running from EMU Central countriesc 
 
Panel A: Causality running from EMU Central to Peripheral countries 
 Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period Break date Causality 
changes 
AT  IE Yes No 07/05/2010 - 
AT  IT No Yes 11/23/2010 New 
AT  GR No No 05/11/2010 - 
AT  PT No Yes 05/11/2010 New 
AT  SP Yes Yes 11/23/2010 Intensification 
BE  IE Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
BE  IT Yes Yes 05/11/2010 Intensification 
BE  GR Yes No 05/11/2010 - 
BE  PT No Yes 11/30/2009 New 
BE  SP No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
FI  IE Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
FI  IT Yes Yes 05/11/2010 Intensification 
FI  GR Yes Yes 05/11/2010 Intensification 
FI  PT No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
FI SP Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
FR  IE No Yes 07/05/2010 New 
FR  IT Yes Yes 05/07/2010 Intensification 
FR  GR No No 05/03/2010 - 
FR  PT Yes No 07/04/2008 - 
FR SP Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Intensification 
GE  IE Yes Yes 11/22/2010 Reduction 
GE  IT No Yes 05/10/2010 New 
GE  GR No Yes 12/10/2010 New 
GE  PT Yes Yes 01/08/2008 Reduction 
GE SP Yes Yes 01/14/2010 Intensification 
NL  IE Yes No 11/21/2010 - 
NL  IT Yes Yes 05/10/2010 Reduction 
NL  GR No Yes 12/10/2010 New 
NL  PT Yes Yes 08/18/2008 Reduction 
NL SP Yes Yes 11/25/2010 Reduction 
 
Panel B: Causality running within EMU Central countries  
 Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period Break date Causality 
changes 
AT  BE Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
AT  FI No Yes 11/25/2010 New 
AT  FR Yes Yes 06/10/2008 Intensification 
AT  GE Yes Yes 07/01/2008 Intensification 
AT  NL No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
BE  AT Yes Yes 06/01/2009 Reduction 
BE  FI Yes Yes 06/04/2010 Intensification 
BE  FR Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
BE  GE Yes Yes 11/04/2008 Reduction 
BE  NL No Yes 07/24/2008 New 
FI  AT Yes Yes 05/01/2009 Intensification 
FI  BE No Yes 11/24/2010 New 
FI  FR Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
FI  GE Yes Yes 07/01/2008 Intensification 
FI  NL No Yes 06/04/2010 New 
FR  AT No Yes 05/10/2010 New 
FR  BE Yes Yes 05/11/2010 Reduction 
FR  FI Yes Yes 10/08/2008 Reduction 
FR  GE Yes Yes 07/01/2008 Intensification 
FR  NL Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Intensification 
GE  AT Yes Yes 06/06/2009 Intensification 
GE  BE Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Intensification 
GE  FI No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
GE  FR No Yes 02/19/2008 New 
GE  NL No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
NL  AT Yes Yes 01/06/2009 Intensification 
NL  BE Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Intensification 
NL  FI Yes Yes 10/28/2008 Reduction 
NL  FR Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Reduction 
NL  GE Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Intensification 
 
                                                          
c Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
 Bold values indicate absence of Granger-causality.  
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